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The Brand X Effect

Wagner and others have suggested, and so they must be more selective
in choosing lawsuits with the best prospect for success. 290 Regulated
entities, on the other hand, have resources and an incentive to challenge
agency decisions to delay the implementation of those decisions, even if
the challenges will ultimately be unsuccessful. 291 Regulated entities
could be losing more cases simply because they are less selective in
choosing cases where they could prevail.
In discussing her study of the air toxics rules, Professor Wagner
suggests another reason why environmental groups may be more
successful than regulated entities when challenging EPA decisions that
could apply to the findings of this study as well. As noted above, she
outlines the grossly disproportionate access that regulated entities have
to agencies in the rulemaking process and suggests that EPA makes so
many legally questionable concessions to regulated entities during that
process that there are very few legitimate bases on which regulated
entities can challenge the rules that are finally adopted. 292 On the other
hand, since so many of the legally questionable interpretations adopted
by the agency favor regulated entities, these interpretations provide
easy cannon fodder for challenges by environmental groups.
Regardless of why environmental groups are more successful in
challenging EPA, this study suggests that EPA will continue to lose
Chevron challenges in court if it ignores the purposes of the statutes it
administers and relies too heavily on influence from regulated entities.
In the current de-regulatory climate, there will be additional pressure
put on EPA to adopt legally questionable statutory interpretations
advanced by regulated entities. However, this study suggests that when
EPA follows that impulse, if its decisions are overturned on appeal,
they will likely be overturned at Chevron Step One, so that the agency
will not be able to ignore the judicial interpretation of the statute in
the future. While Chevron deference has not left the stage, the circuit
courts appear more willing to ignore the agency's statutory
interpretations and adopt their own, especially when it appears that
the agency has been captured by the entities it regulates. Whether that
impacts EPA's decision-making process remains to be seen.

290. See Wagner, Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 1390-91.
291. Id.
292. See supra Part 11.D. See also Wagner, Rulemaking in the Shade, supra
note 20, at 108-09.

116

